


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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## WHY EUROPE IS SKEPTICAL OF BYRNES' ALLIANCE PROPOSAL

LITTLE visible progress has as yet been made in Paris toward agreement among the Big Four on the terms of peace treaties with Italy and the Axis satellites in Eastern Europe. This lack of progress appears all the more disappointing to Washington because the Truman Administration had hoped that the Byrnes proposal for a 25-year alliance against renewal of aggression by Germany and Japan would restore a feeling of confidence between the wartime allies, and open the way to a far-reaching settlement.

**U.S. PLAN FOR MILITARY ALLIANCE.** The draft of a four-power treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany (a similar treaty is proposed for Japan) had not been on the official agenda of the Paris conference, but was publicly announced by Secretary of State Byrnes on April 29. American sources have stated that the proposal for this treaty had been submitted to Britain and Russia as early as the Big Three conference at Moscow last December, eliciting little enthusiasm at that time on the part of either Mr. Bevin or Mr. Molotov. So far as can be determined, however, the proposal was then couched in the most general terms.

From the point of view of the United States, which throughout its history has opposed "entangling alliances" except for the temporary purpose of waging war, the Byrnes draft marks an important milestone on the road away from isolationism, and for that reason deserves to be welcomed. The very fact that it represents a sharp break with traditional policy caused Mr. Byrnes to proceed with understandable caution and secrecy in suggesting this procedure to Britain and Russia, for fear that premature disclosure might provoke criticism in Congress and in the country which would jeopardize its chances. The Byrnes plan had been drafted in the hope of preventing a division of Europe (as

well as other areas) into two hostile worlds—the Western world, dominated by the United States and Britain, and the regions bordering on the U.S.S.R., dominated by Moscow. Actually, the proposed alliance stemmed from a suggestion made by Senator Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, in 1945, and therefore carried all the more weight since it offered the hope that Mr. Vandenberg, who is a member of the American delegation in Paris, would rally the support of Republicans in Congress for the policy of the Administration.

The cool, in fact caustic, reception accorded by the Soviet press to the Byrnes draft has caused a further revulsion of feeling against Russia in Washington, where the belief is gaining ground that the Soviet government is concerned not with Russia's security against future aggression by Germany and Japan, but with an effort to undermine the "capitalist" system. In support of this view it is pointed out that Russia supports Communist parties in Europe; maintains armed forces estimated at over two million in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; backs Yugoslavia against Italy on Trieste; refuses to accept demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands; continues to demand a trusteeship over the Italian colony of Tripolitania, although in modified form; fosters a network of barter trade agreements with neighboring countries; and, most recently, displays sympathy for the Arabs in the crisis over Palestine.

**NOT ONLY RUSSIA OBJECTS.** It is not Russia alone, however, which expresses skepticism concerning the proposal presented by Mr. Byrnes. And it is important for us to understand why. This proposal, if made in 1919, would have proved a major contribution to the stabilization of Europe, which was then dangerously unbalanced by the rising power of Germany, the growing weakness of France,

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and the withdrawal, for the time being, of Russia. Even had the United States suggested a Big Four alliance before or shortly after V-E Day, it would have given much-needed encouragement to those who looked to us for post-war leadership, and would have checked the re-emergence of groups all over Europe, notably in Germany, who still nourish hopes of reviving Nazism and Fascism. But, as cannot be repeated too often, much water has flowed under the bridge since May 1945. The world has undergone such profound changes as a result of six years of war and one year of treaty-less peace that, to put it bluntly, the Byrnes proposal, revolutionary as it may seem from the point of view of the United States, is bound to appear to weary and hungry Europeans as a quarter of a century too late. Just as our well-intentioned plans for free world trade and an International Trade Organization have been formulated at a time when many other countries have had, not by choice but by sheer necessity, to adopt more or less controlled economies, so our plans for a military alliance, inspired by a desire to reassure our wartime allies, notably Russia, concerning our long-term intentions, come at a time when people from one end of Europe to the other have lost confidence in our determination to implement our indubitably good intentions.

Judging by President Truman's message to Congress on May 6 concerning military collaboration with other American republics the Administration has, as an alternative policy in case of failure of its 25-year alliance draft, a program for the unification and standardization of military forces and equipment throughout the Western Hemisphere, including Canada which, if adopted, would have far-reaching implications both for our relations with Britain and Russia and for the future of the United Nations organization. This program would seem to

## WILL U.S. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES IN PALESTINE?

The fundamental common sense of the 44,000-word Palestine Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry is attested by the fact that it has provoked denunciations from both Arabs and Jews, most of whom continue to adhere to the uncompromising views they have steadfastly maintained for the past generation. Violent verbal attacks by the Arabs culminated on May 3 in a 12-hour protest strike of an estimated 1,000,000 people, which halted commercial life in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, and resulted in a riotous demonstration in Jerusalem during which British soldiers were stoned. Threatening to resume the "national struggle" of 1936 to 1939 if the Palestine Report's ten recommendations are adopted, the Arab Higher Committee, which was formed in November 1945 to represent all Arab parties in Palestine, sent a note

accept the breaking up of the world into spheres of influence of the great powers, with the United States taking the leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Such a policy was once favored by some Washington officials, and was denounced by its opponents as "hemisphere isolation."

**NATIONALISM STILL HAMPERS INTERNATIONALISM.** The fundamental difficulty is that while we now genuinely believe in the need for international cooperation as we never have before, our actions still follow the well-worn groove of nationalist thinking and practice. If the United States intended as far back as last December to cooperate with Britain, Russia and France in keeping Germany and Japan disarmed and demilitarized, why, other nations ask, have we been so anxious to withdraw our troops from Europe and Asia as rapidly as possible and to reduce our armed forces? If the United States intends to give financial aid to those groups in Europe who could aid the continent's reconstruction, why, other nations ask, is Congress so loath to grant a line of credit to the British Labor government and the Administration seemingly reluctant to accede to the pleas for aid of France's Socialist leader, Léon Blum?

If Russia alone were pressing us for answers to these questions, we might be justified in yielding to the suspicion that a conspiracy against the "capitalist" system is afoot. But these questions are being asked of us by many who have been our friends in Europe in the common fight against Nazism and Fascism, who above all want us to succeed, but who have suffered so much from our past indecisions and divided counsels on foreign policy that they are slow to trust our conversion to international cooperation. What can we do to convince them?

VERA MICHELES DEAN

*(The third in a series of articles on the peace negotiations in Paris.)*

of protest on May 2 to the British Cabinet. Meanwhile, a second mass demonstration has been called for May 10, and several Arab groups are reported to be planning to ask for Russian aid.

Nor is Arab agitation limited to Palestine alone. Representatives of seven other Arab states voted on May 5 to call an extraordinary session of the Arab League to take measures against the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations. Three days earlier, Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, the League's secretary general, had officially warned the British and United States governments against adopting the Report. Azzam Pasha told a press conference the Arab states would consider later whether to bring their case before the United Nations. The immediate and widespread character of Arab reaction justifies the Committee of Inquiry's conclusion

that hostility is deeply rooted throughout the Arab population and is not, as Zionists claim, merely propaganda by the rich effendi class.

**REPORT FAVORS NEITHER ARAB NOR JEWISH STATE.** Since the Palestine Report favored the Jews to the extent of recommending removal of White Paper restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases, their reaction against the Report was less extreme. However, in advocating that Palestine "be neither a Jewish nor an Arab State," the Committee of Inquiry struck at the heart of Zionist political aims. It is not surprising, therefore, that Jewish approval of the Report was limited to a few organizations like the American Council for Judaism, which opposes all efforts to create a Jewish state. The American Zionist Emergency Council, spokesman for 600,000 Zionists, was joined by other leading Jewish groups in approving removal of the White Paper restrictions but attacking the longer-range proposals as an infringement of Jewish rights.

In recommending that 100,000 Jews be transferred to Palestine "as rapidly as conditions will permit," the six American and six British members of the Committee unanimously endorsed a suggestion made by President Truman on August 31, 1945. The President, in a statement accompanying publication of the Report on April 30, expressed himself as very happy at this step, but declared that "the report deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement." These remarks have aroused speculation such as that of Senator Arthur Capper, Republican of Kansas, who on May 4, voiced his pleasure that the President had not committed himself to accept the recommendation opposing a Jewish state in Palestine. Without attempting to read too much into Mr. Truman's comments, it is pertinent to recall that a plank in the 1944 Democratic party platform favored establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

**ANGLO-AMERICAN DISAGREEMENT.** That President Truman's remarks aroused British concern was indicated on May 1, when Prime Minister Attlee

## SERIOUS ECONOMIC AND LABOR

The trip to Washington on May 8 of Manuel Roxas, President-Elect of the Philippines, and Paul McNutt, U.S. High Commissioner, emphasizes the urgency of the economic needs of this strategic outpost in the Pacific. Little progress has been made in restoring transportation, rebuilding ruined areas or obtaining a supply of water buffaloes (40 per cent of which were destroyed during the Japanese occupation) for work in the rice fields. Inflation is still an acute problem. Total living costs were recently estimated by the U.S. Department of Commerce as nearly four times the pre-war level, and are much

read in the House of Commons a prepared statement which has since given rise to an Anglo-American controversy. Mr. Attlee said that Britain would take no action until it could "ascertain to what extent the United States will be prepared to share the resulting additional military and financial responsibilities." Moreover, he declared that large numbers of Jews could not be admitted to Palestine until illegal Jewish armed organizations had been disbanded, and that Britain would deal not with individual recommendations but with the Report as a whole.

Mr. Attlee's views have raised protests not only from the Jews but from two American members of the Committee of Inquiry, Bartley C. Crum and Frank W. Buxton, who on May 2 stated publicly their strong opposition to postponing the immigration of 100,000 Jews until Jewish organizations in Palestine had been disarmed. President Truman, in his press conference on the same day, declined to comment on the British Prime Minister's suggestions.

Although many Americans, including Frank Aydelotte of the Committee of Inquiry, express sympathy for the British view that the United States ought to share responsibility as well as give advice about Palestine, there is virtually no support on Capitol Hill for the idea of American military aid. Senators Ball and LaFollette agree that this country has some responsibility, but suggest that the United Nations is the proper agency to handle the problem. United Nations trusteeship for Palestine is recommended by the Report, and growing rumors indicate that the Arab-Jewish conflict may be brought before the Security Council as constituting a threat to the peace of the Middle East. Meanwhile, the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of despairing Jewish refugees still awaits solution. The Report urges the United States and Britain, in association with other countries, to make immediate attempts to find new homes for all displaced persons, but emphasizes that there is no place other than Palestine where the great majority of Jews can go in the immediate future.

VERNON MCKAY

## PROBLEMS CONFRONT ROXAS

higher on some essential items. Mr. Roxas has announced that he will seek a short-term loan of \$500,000,000; even though the Bell and Tydings bills—which provide, respectively, \$625,000,000 in cash or supplies for war damage and an 8-year period of free trade—have been passed by Congress and signed by President Truman.

**ROXAS WINS CONSERVATIVES.** The victory of Mr. Roxas over President Sergio Osmeña in the elections on April 23 was decisive. Both Mr. Roxas and Mr. Osmeña have been outstanding figures in the *Nacionalista* (majority) party for

many years, and there was little to choose between their platforms. Mr. Roxas, who is 54 years old, is a dynamic speaker, and campaigned vigorously against his 68-year-old rival, who made only one speech. He also had the support of many followers of the late President Quezón. Roxas' reinstatement as Brigadier General in the Philippine Army, with the blessing of General MacArthur, seems to have answered satisfactorily previous charges that he was a collaborationist. He won support from conservative business men, including Andres Soriano, former Franco consul in Manila, and was opposed by Communist tenant-farmers in Luzon. Roxas stoutly denied that he is a "Fascist."

Both sides were guilty of disorders in which several persons were killed. Mr. Roxas went into hiding just before the election, hinting that he expected an attempt to kidnap him. But considering the abnormal condition of the last five years and the widespread distribution of fire arms, the election was quieter than many had prophesied. On April 27 Roxas had 958,294 votes to Osmeña's 822,836. His Vice Presidential candidate, Elpidio Quirino, was elected by a smaller margin. Roxas also appeared to have substantial majorities in the Assembly and Senate. He will take office as Commonwealth President on May 28, and as first President of the Philippine Republic on July 4, when the islands achieve independence. President Truman, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General MacArthur have been invited to attend the latter ceremony.

Although Filipinos have had nearly fifty years of American tutelage and steadily increasing self-government, a democracy along United States lines is hardly to be expected in the future, whatever the constitutional forms of the Republic may prove to be. Mr. Quezón, for example, exercised almost dictatorial power within the limitations of the Commonwealth; Mr. Roxas will be, in practice, even less limited under the Republic.

#### PROBLEMS FACING REPUBLIC. The immedi-

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ate problem of reconstruction should be solved sooner or later with the funds which the United States is providing under the Bell Act. A section of this Act, which gives American citizens equal rights to property with Filipinos, has been criticized as "unilateral," although it will encourage the investment of much-needed United States capital. The Tydings Act, which grants free admission of major Philippine products to the United States on a quota basis for eight years, thereafter imposes a duty of 5 per cent, increasing annually for twenty years. The 8-year free trade period is considered by some too short to enable the Philippines to readjust themselves to a rising tariff wall thereafter.

Law and order have been partially restored, but many Moros and Christian Filipinos still bear arms. Exploitation of tenant farmers by landlords and usurers continues in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and some other provinces. The Hukbalahaps, recruited by Communist organizers from these tenants, are estimated at 75,000, of whom 12,000 are armed. Mr. Roxas promised, if elected, to stamp out disorder within thirty days—a promise which need not be taken too literally. It is true that the Philippine government cannot tolerate armed bands that defy its authority, but permanent peace in these provinces will not be established until the historic grievances of the peasantry have been relieved. Whether Mr. Roxas, and a legislature composed chiefly of landlords, lawyers and professional politicians, will achieve anything tangible in this direction remains to be seen. It appears improbable, however, that disturbances will occur on a widespread scale throughout the islands, if only because of the stabilizing effect of American naval and military bases and their garrisons.

WALTER WILGUS

*The Economic Development of the Middle East*, by Alfred Bonné. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$4.00

A survey of the economic problems and potentialities of the Arab lands. Mr. Bonné touches on population growth, land ownership and use, financial requirements and absorptive capacity of a region which will play an increasingly important part in world political and economic development.

*I Accuse de Gaulle*, by Henri de Kerillis. New York, Harcourt, 1946. \$2.75

A former member of the Chamber of Deputies who voted against Pétain in 1940 presents the strongest indictment of de Gaulle as a political leader that has yet appeared. Since the author believes the Free French movement should have remained a purely military organization, he shares the view held so tenaciously by the State Department during the war.